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A New Positive Economic Theory of
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Mark F. Gradyt
Within the last generation, economic analysis has produced a wealth of
insights into common law principles and especially into the common law
of tort.1 Two distinct traditions have emerged within the economic ap-
proach to tort law. The normative tradition attempts to evaluate the eco-
nomic desirability of liability rules with a view toward reforming them.
In contrast, the positive tradition uses economic concepts to explain com-
mon law liability rules with a view toward gaining a better understanding
of the rules themselves and of their social consequences.' The hypothesis
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1. The history of the law and economics movement is discussed in Landes & Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852-56 (1981); G. Priest, The Rise of Law and
Economics (Oct. 28, 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with Civil Liability Program, Yale Law
School).
2. The leading normative theorist and the co-founder of the economic approach to tort is Guido
Calabresi, whose fully developed theory is laid out in G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). The earliest statement of his theory is in Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). Other important
articles by Calabresi on the normative economic theory of tort are Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts]; Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonder-
ful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1975); Calabresi, Does the Fault System Opti-
mally Control Primary Accident Costs', 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (1968); Calabresi, Trans-
action Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968);
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
The other co-founder of the economic approach to tort is Ronald Coase, whose leading work in this
area is Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Some parts of Coase's analysis
are normative, see id. at 36-38, and other parts are positive, see id. at 19-28. Coase's theory has been
reconsidered and extended in Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Demsetz,
When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, I J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972). The most recent important
contribution to the normative economic theory of tort is Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in
the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980).
3. The leading work in the positive economic theory of tort is Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1
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that the positive economic theory of tort seeks to confirm or refute is that
tort rules are designed to minimize social cost-the sum of precaution
costs expended in attempting to prevent accidents and injury costs result-
ing when such accidents occur.'
Positive theory must have means to ascertain which liability rules mini-
mize social cost and whether the actual liability rules that courts employ
do so. Thus, each positive tort theory contains two parts. First, there is a
formal part that posits particular rules and ascertains their social conse-
quences using the tools of economic theory. Second, there is an empirical
part that assesses whether the rules posited in the formal model corre-
spond to decision rules that courts actually use. Any particular positive
theory of tort can thus be challenged on two levels: that its formal liability
rules would not minimize social cost or that its formal liability rules do
not correspond to the ones that courts use.
This Article seeks to provide an alternative to the conventional theory
of negligence law, set forth by John Prather Brown, 5 William Landes,
and Richard Posner.' First, it discusses the formal negligence rules speci-
J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). Other important contributions by Richard Posner and William Landes
are Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Landes & Posner, Causation]; Landes & Posner, supra note 1; Landes &
Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L L. & ECON. REV. 127 (1981); Landes &
Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors]; Landes & Posner, Salvors, Find-
ers, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Analysis of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83 (1978). Additional significant contributions by Posner alone are R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-61 (2d ed. 1977); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1 (1979); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). Important contributions to the positive economic theory of
tort by scholars other than Landes and Posner include Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Lia-
bility, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 366 (1974); Diamond & Mirlees, On the Assignment of Liability: The Uni-
form Case, 6 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 487 (1975); Green, On the Optimal Structure of Liabil-
ity Laws, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 553 (1976); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the
Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Shavell,
Causation and the Scope of Liability]; Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1980); Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Dam-
ages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1981).
4. This condition is somewhat different from the Kaldor-Hicks welfare test, which states that a
transfer from A to B is efficient when B's gain in utility is more than sufficient to compensate A for
his loss. In its weakest form, the test states that such a transfer is efficient even if B does not actually
compensate A. For a discussion of the test, see W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS 528-31 (4th ed. 1977). For a provocative discussion of different standards of efficiency, see
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980). On the related controversy surrounding the hypothesis that tort law is
attempting to maximize wealth, see Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980);
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
5. Brown, supra note 3. This theory replaced some of Richard Posner's earlier theory, which he
developed in Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, supra note 3. Posner and Landes have now adopted the
Brown theory of breach of duty in preference to Posner's original theory on this subject. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 1, at 865 n.41.
6. Landes and Posner have significantly extended the Brown theory in Landes & Posner, Causa-
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fled by this theory. Next, it argues that these rules do not lead to mini-
mum social cost under conditions of uncertainty. As an alternative, it pro-
poses a new formal rule that appears more surely to lead to minimum
social cost under uncertainty. Finally, it shows that this new negligence
rule is more consistent with the actual decision rules used by courts than
the formal rules posited by the conventional theory.
I. The Conventional Positive Theory of Negligence
A negligence rule performs two tasks.7 First, it determines when an
injurer-usually the defendant 8-- has not taken enough precaution. This
task is performed by the "breach of duty" element of negligence. Second, a
negligence rule decides when an injurer's insufficient precaution makes
him liable for the victim's loss. This is the "causation" element of negli-
gence. Only when the injurer's breach of duty was the legal cause of the
victim's loss will the injurer be liable for it under the rule of negligence.
There are two corresponding parts to the positive economic theory of neg-
ligence: one about breach of duty and another about legal causation.
A. Defining Breach of Duty
The conventional theory of negligence defines breach of duty by com-
paring an individual's actual level of precaution with the level that mini-
mizes social costs.9 I will call the social-cost-minimizing precaution level
P* and the conventional method of defining breach of duty the P*-com-
parison approach. Under the conventional theory, whenever an injurer
has imposed loss on a victim and the injurer's actual precaution was less
than the P* level, the injurer has committed a breach of duty.
Figure 1 is a geometrical depiction of the negligence problem. It shows,
from an injurer's perspective, the marginal costs and benefits (measured
along the y-axis) associated with different levels of precaution (measured
along the x-axis).
The curve labeled R denotes the marginal reduction in expected harm
at different levels of precaution. 10 The height of the R-curve at a particu-
tion, supra note 3; Landes & Posner, supra note 1; Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors,
supra note 3.
7. See Shavell, Causation and the Scope of Liability, supra note 3, at 463-64.
8. In some proximate cause situations, there will be more than one injurer, one of whom may not
be a defendant. See Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S.W. 647 (1908). Also
where contributory or comparative negligence is involved the plaintiff is simultaneously the victim and
one of his own injurers. See Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 3, at 518;
Wittman, supra note 3. This Article does not analyze problems of victim fault or of proximate cause.
9. Brown, supra note 3, at 328; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 873-74; Landes & Posner,
Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 3, at 521-22.
10. In Figure 1, R decreases as P increases. Thus, additional units of precaution decrease ex-
pected harm by decreasing amounts. This assumption is consistent with the traditional economic as-
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lar precaution level is the reduction in expected harm that would result
from a one-unit increase in precaution. The area Under the R-curve be-
tween one precaution level and another is the reduction in expected acci-
dent costs caused by the increase in precaution over the interval. For ex-
ample, if precaution is increased from P1 to P*, expected harm decreases
by an amount equal to the sum of areas III and IV. The area defined by
points 0, A, and Pma, represents the total harm that would be expected if
no precaution were taken.1"
Figure 1
0 P, P* P, Pmax P
sumption of diminishing marginal returns.
11. For the total area under the R-curve to correspond to the total expected harm that would exist
if the injurer took zero precaution one must assume that total expected harm at P,. is zero. This
assumption will aid the exposition, but will not limit the generality of the analysis that follows.
An R-curve is defined only with respect to some amount of information. This level of information is
assumed to be given (or exogenous) when the R-curve is drawn. The amount of information that
courts use in estimating expected harm is "reasonable foresight." The Figure 1 R-curve is thus as-
sumed to be drawn based on reasonable foresight. The theory of what amount of information consti-
tutes reasonable foresight is beyond the scope of this Article. The area superscribed by the R-curve
can be called the "reasonably foreseeable risk"; it is the amount and type of expected harm that
reasonable foresight would predict.
Although Shavell does not use the R-curve construct, he has a theory about how courts determine
the relevant expected harm. See Shavell, Causation and the Scope of Liability, supra note 3, at 485-
89.
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The curve labeled C represents the marginal cost of precaution. In Fig-
ure 1, this curve is flat, reflecting a constant marginal cost for all levels of
precaution.1" The area under the C-curve between one precaution level
and another is the increase in the total cost of precaution that results from
the increase in precaution over the interval. Thus, if precaution is in-
creased from P1 to P*, the cost of precaution increases by an amount
equal to area IV.
The optimal level of precaution, P*, which minimizes the sum of ex-
pected harm and precaution cost, 13 is the precaution level at which the R-
and the C-curves intersect. When actual precaution is less than P*, society
would benefit from additional precaution; conversely, when actual is
greater than P*, society would benefit from less precaution. Precaution
level P, is not optimal because an increase in precaution to P* would
decrease expected harm by an amount equal to the sum of areas III and
IV, but would increase precaution cost only by an amount equal to area
IV. Thus, the net social saving from this increase in precaution is equal to
area III, which is the amount by which social cost at P, exceeds social cost
at P*. Because social cost is lower at P*, social cost cannot be at a mini-
mum when the injurer is operating at P1 . Similarly, precaution level P. is
not optimal; using analogous reasoning one can easily determine that de-
creasing precaution to P* would result in a net social saving equal to the
area V.
B. Determining Legal Causation
Under the P*-comparison approach, an individual who has taken due
care-has selected P*-is not liable for any harm that he has imposed on
another. Victims will still be harmed by the injurer's activity. Their ex-
pected losses will equal the areas of VI and VII, but the injurer will not
be liable for these "unavoidable accidents."1 4 Only under a rule of strict
liability-not under a rule of negligence-would an injurer who has taken
P* be liable for such losses.'
12. The analysis in this Article is not dependent upon the assumption of constant marginal costs.
To avoid corner solutions, however, the C- and R-curves must intersect, and the C-curve cannot fall
at a faster rate than the R-curve.
13. The model here is simplified by assuming that the level of activity is independent of the level
of precautionary behavior, that is, that reductions in the level of production are not an available
precaution strategy, and hence not potential costs of precaution. For an example of a model in which
reducing the level of activity is one possible precautionary strategy, see Shavell, Causation and the
Scope of Liability, supra note 3, at 465 (taking into account "benefits parties derive from engaging in
their activities").
14. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 297 (1850).
15. In traditional strict liability, there is liability for the entire amount under the R-curve. See,
e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967); Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). So, if strict liability
attaches to concussion harm from rocket testing, there would be liability for all concussion harm under
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A question about legal causation arises only when an injurer has com-
mitted a breach of duty by taking less precaution than p.. 6 Courts using
the P*-comparison approach to breach of duty could resolve this legal
causation problem in either of two possible ways. One way would be to
hold the negligent individual1" strictly liable for all harm that results.
Under this rule, which I will call the full liability rule, an injurer operat-
ing at P1 is liable for the entire amount of expected harm that remains at
P1-the areas III, IV, VI, and VII.18 Alternatively, a court might impose
liability on an injurer only if the accident would have been prevented had
the individual exercised due care." Under this latter rule, which I will
call the P*-cutoff rule, an injurer operating at P1 would be liable only for
an amount equal to the areas III and IV.
The two rules embody very different notions of legal causation. The
causal concept implicit in the P*-cutoff rule is but-for causation. Under
this rule, courts conduct an evaluation2 of whether an accident that has
occurred could have been prevented if the injurer had exercised due care.21
the R-curve regardless of how much precaution was taken. The rocket tester, however, would not be
strictly liable for non-concussion harm (if strict liability does not attach to it).
16. In legal analysis the problem of causation is not always posterior to the problem of breach of
duty. Courts will sometimes assume a breach of duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to dispose of a
case on easy causation grounds. See, e.g., McDowall v. Great Western Ry., [1903] 2 K.B. 331, 338
(C.A.) (Vaughan William, L.J.); infra pp. 827-28 (discussing Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311,
265 N.E.2d 762, 317 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970)); infra note 67 (discussing McDowall). For present pur-
poses, it is convenient to analyze the two negligence issues, breach of duty and cause in fact, as if
breach of duty were always the prior question.
17. For purposes of this Article, a negligent individual is one who commits a breach of duty.
18. This full liability negligence rule is the one used in Shavell, Causation and the Scope of
Liability, supra note 3, at 489 ("once one recognizes that under the negligence rule there is an impor-
tant element of strict liability (for a variety of reasons a party attempting to exercise due care may be
found negligent), all the results concerning the scope of liability under strict liability become relevant
under the negligence rule"). Landes and Posner also used the full liability model of negligence in
Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 3, at 521-22; Landes & Posner, supra
note 1, at 874, 882.
19. This is the approach that Landes and Posner seem to take in their most recent article. See
Landes & Posner, Causation, supra note 3, at 115-18.
20. Unlike breach of duty, which is largely an ex ante standard, cause in fact is an ex post
determination.
21. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920). This is the most rigorous
formulation of cause in fact. When it is not certain whether this test is met, a problem of evidence and
presumptions arises that is beyond the scope of this Article. It can be said, however, that the greater
the breach of duty, the more probable it is that the untaken precaution would have prevented the
harm. Thus, less independent evidence of cause in fact will be required when the untaken precaution
is of a character that "greatly multiplies the chances of accident." Reynolds v. Texas & P. Ry., 37 La.
Ann. 694 (1885). In other words, less independent evidence of cause in fact is needed when the
defendant was at P, than when he was at a precaution level infinitesimally less than P* (and the
breach of duty is shown in both cases with the failure to take P*). Because the plaintiff can offer
several different untaken precautions as alternative theories of the breach of duty, there can be several
cause in fact issues in a given case, that is, whether untaken precaution x would have prevented the
harm, whether untaken precaution y would have prevented the harm, and so forth. See, e.g., Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Hess Tankship Co., 661 F.2d 1044, 1052-54 (5th Cir. 1981); Stacy v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614, 616-17, 54 N.W. 1091, 1091-92 (1893).
The courts have relaxed the requirement of but-for causation in the special situation of concurrent
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In contrast, under the full liability rule the relevant concept is that of a
"causal link": Courts attempt to ascertain, on an actuarial basis, whether
the harm that the victim suffered resulted from the injurer's activity and
was of the kind that more precaution by the injurer would have reduced
or prevented.2  Thus, the full liability rule has a less restrictive notion of
causation than does the P*-cutoff rule.
Despite these differences, both rules will induce injurers to exercise the
level of precaution that minimizes social cost under conditions of perfect
certainty. Under either rule, injurers will have an incentive to operate at
P*.
Consider the full liability rule first. An individual will never exercise
precaution greater than P*. Operating at P*, he will be found to have
exercised due care and thus be shielded from liability. Precaution beyond
P* will increase the injurer's precaution costs, but will not reduce his
expected liability (which, by definition, will already be zero).2' Similarly,
an injurer will not choose to operate below P*. Suppose for example that
he chose P, as his level of precaution. He would then face an expected
liability equal to the sum of areas III, IV, VI, and VII. By expending an
amount equal to area IV in additional precaution, that is, by moving to
P*, he can reduce his expected liability to zero, thus saving an amount
equal to the sum of areas III, VI, and VII. This argument is a general
one, as it does not depend on the distance between P* and P. 2"
sufficient causation where two causal chains for which two different people are responsible each
would have been sufficient to cause the plaintiff's harm. See, e.g., Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250,
65 N.E. 69 (1902); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913 (1927). This is a
relatively rare but interesting situation. Shavell has given an account of the economic policy underly-
ing the special rule for cases of this type. Shavell, Causation and the Scope of Liability, supra note 3,
at 494-95. The special situation of concurrent sufficient causation is beyond the scope of this Article.
The peculiar problems of successive causation of the type involved in Maddux v. Donaldson, 362
Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961), are also beyond the scope of this Article.
For an excellent discussion of the general problem of cause in fact, see Weinrib, A Step Forward in
Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518 (1975).
22. Calabresi originally developed the concept of causal link in Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts, supra note 2, at 71 ("There is a causal link between an act or activity and an
injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence of that act or
activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.").
23. Following the conventional theory, see Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 867-68, I assume
that individuals are risk-neutral. I also assume that litigation and settlement costs are so low that all
plaintiffs with meritorious negligence cases are compensated for the full amount of their damages, so
that injurers expect to be liable for all legally recoverable harm. Proponents of the conventional theory
have made the same assumption. See id. at 882.
24. There is, however, an important qualification regarding this exposition. Each individual's R-
curve is a function of the precaution taken by other individuals. To facilitate the exposition of the
central argument of this Article, this interdependency is ignored. As a formal matter, the interdepen-
dency is not significant for the problems analyzed here when: (1) the injurer knows that other individ-
uals will exercise the levels of precaution that would be optimal given optimal precaution by the
injurer himself; or (2) these other individuals either make their precaution choices before the injurer
does or do not have the opportunity of noticing the increased risk created by the injurer's suboptimal
precaution. In terms of the example used below, see infra pp. 807-08, the people living beneath the
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Now, consider the P*-cutoff rule. Once again, an individual will never
operate beyond P* because he will be shielded from liability by picking
P*. Neither will an individual pick P1, because at that level he would face
an expected liability equal to the sum of areas III and IV. (An injurer
subject to the P*-cutoff rule who is operating at P1 will not face liability
for areas VI and VII because the but-for cause requirement will shield
him from liability for accidents that would have occurred even if he had
exercised due care.) By moving from P, to P* he can decrease his ex-
pected liability by an amount equal to the sum of areas III and IV. These
savings can be accomplished by expending an amount equal to area IV in
additional precaution. Thus, the exercise of due care will lead to a private
saving equal to area III.
The major claim of the conventional positive theory of negligence law is
that the P*-comparison approach will lead to the minimization of social
cost. The preceding discussion shows that under conditions of perfect cer-
tainty, this result is independent of whether the scope of liability is limited
by a restrictive but-for causation requirement or a broad causal link
requirement.
II. A Critique of the Conventional View
The two rules for defining the scope of liability have different conse-
quences for a negligent individual, but both create an incentive for indi-
viduals to exercise due care under conditions of perfect certainty. This
result, while correct, is somewhat counterintuitive. In a model in which
behavior is shaped by expected costs, one would imagine that the choice
between liability rules having different economic consequences should af-
fect the conduct of a potential injurer. The absence of these effects sug-
gests an underlying rigidity in the specification of the model. For this rea-
son, it is important to focus on whether the behavioral results that flow
from the model depend on unduly restrictive assumptions.
My critique of the conventional theory stems from the examination of
the effects of the assumption that injurers can always identify with perfect
certainty the precaution level that courts will determine to be p*.2 5 Proba-
dam are assumed to be taking precaution consistent with the dam owner being at P*, and they are
assumed to be unable to notice the increased risk that results when the dam owner takes less precau-
tion than P*.
25. Brown assumes that both courts and injurers make no errors in identifying P*. As to courts,
he writes, "For our purposes the only function of the legal system is the impeccable administration of
whatever liability rule is in force. In order to concentrate on what is our major concern, the parties'
behavior, we ignore . . . the mistakes that a court can make . . . ." Brown, supra note 3, at 327.
That injurers also do not make errors in estimating P* is implicit in Brown's assumption that they
know their own R-curves and C-curves perfectly. He writes, "Both parties [injurer and victim] are
assumed to know A [the magnitude of harm that will result if precaution is not taken], W x [the
injurer's C-curve], Wy [the victim's C-curve], and P(XY) [the R-curve that depends on the levels of
Vol. 92: 799, 1983
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bly the best way for an injurer to assess whether he is at P* would be for
him to consider whether there are any further precautions-beyond those
currently planned or taken-that would reduce expected harm by a
greater amount than the cost that they would impose. This is also the
most plausible way by which a court could determine whether an injurer
was taking less precaution than P*. If the injurer was operating at some
level below P*, such as P1, either the court or injurer could determine this
to be the case by finding some further precaution beyond P1 that would
have cost less than the amount by which it would have reduced expected
harm. In contrast, if the injurer is at P*, no further precaution can be
found that will yield a net benefit.
The incentives to make this analysis accurately are very different before
an accident than after an accident. For example, most dams will never
injurer and victim precaution]." Id. at 335. Shavell also expressly assumes that courts make no errors
in locating P*: "[S]ince we assume the courts have perfect information about accidents, they make no
'mistakes.' They correctly calculate the level of due care; they 'observe' with complete accuracy the
level of care actually exercised by injurers, and so on." Shavell, Causation and the Scope of Liability,
supra note 3, at 485. Implicit in Shavell's analysis of causation is also the idea that injurers do not
make mistakes estimating P*, because they are assumed to know with certainty whether they are
taking due care. He writes, "When deciding whether to exercise due care (clearly, he will not wish to
exercise more than due care), the injurer will have to consider the consequences of exercising less than
due care, of acting in a negligent way." Id. at 486. But see id. at 489 ("for a variety of reasons a party
attempting to exercise due care may be found negligent"). The general premise of Shavell's causal
analysis is that the injurer can know the due care level with certainty and can also correctly predict
the expected liability from exercising less than due care, though both of these assumptions are more
implicit than explicit.
Landes and Posner's assumptions on whether courts and injurers can make mistakes are no longer
clear. In Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 3, at 521, they make no
express assumption about whether either courts or injurers make mistakes in locating P*, though it
seems implicit in their analysis as it develops that neither courts nor injurers make errors very fre-
quently, if they do at all. In Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 879, they expressly assume that both
injurers and courts can make mistakes, but they do not explicitly analyze the consequences of either
assumption. In their most recent article, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, apparently
anticipating the reasoning of this Article on the tendency of the full liability rule to induce overpre-
caution, see infra pp. 811-12, they write that their own analysis
may appear to overlook an easier route, not involving administrative costs, to the conclusion
that there should be no liability in this class of cases [where there is no cause in fact]: if the
defendant is liable for accidents he could not prevent, he will use excessive care. This reason-
ing is incorrect, however - at least under certain conditions concerning the nature and imple-
mentation of the liability standard. If the standard is negligence, if negligence has no stochastic
element, if the negligence standard is applied on an individual rather than average basis, and if
the standard is applied correctly in every case, then liability of however broad a scope will
have only one effect, and that is to induce the defendant to take due care and thereby avoid
liability. In these circumstances, to impose liability for accidents that could not have been
prevented (or whose probability could not have been lowered) by due care is no different from
imposing punitive damages for negligent behavior. However severe, the sanction will not in-
duce any inefficient behavior; it will induce the taking of care, which will avoid the sanction
completely,
Landes & Posner, Causation, supra note 3, at 117. They then add that these assumptions are "exces-
sively restrictive," id., but they do not say what the proper assumptions are. It is therefore difficult to
assess whether they are assuming that injurers and courts make errors. It would appear, however, that
they are assuming that at least courts which, they say, apply the standard "correctly in every case," do
not make errors.
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produce any overflow harm, whether the walls are 110 feet high (P1) or
120 feet high (P*). Before the accident, the value of information to the
potential injurer that P* is 120 feet-not 110 feet-will approach the
area III, under the P*-cutoff rule, or the areas III, VI, and VII under the
full liability rule. If the expected liability from operating at 110 feet is
$100,000, the value of this information to the injurer before the accident is
some fraction of this amount: It is slightly less than $100,000 minus the
cost of the additional precaution that would insulate the injurer from lia-
bility. Now, let us suppose, the unlikely occurs and the dam does over-
flow, and damages totalling $1,000,000 result. The value of the informa-
tion to the victim that a further precaution would have been cost-
beneficial will now approach $1,000,000 and the value of the contrary
information will have an equal value to the injurer. Therefore, it would
not be surprising that at trial the information that the court will receive
about the costs and benefits of 120-foot walls versus 110-foot walls will be
far more perfect than the information that the dam owner would have
found it economical to collect before the accident. It would thus seem rea-
sonable to assume that the courts after a trial will be able to assess
whether actual precaution was less than P* far more accurately than will
an injurer before an accident.2" For the sake of analysis, let us assume
that courts do not make mistakes in estimating P*, but that injurers do.
Although this is a strong assumption, it is somewhat realistic in that the
prior reasoning would indicate that injurer estimates of P* before an acci-
dent would be significantly less accurate than court estimates after an ac-
cident. Also, this assumption that courts do not make mistakes is the same
as that made by the conventional theory."
Although injurers are estimating P* based on imperfect information,
there is no reason to suppose that their information is biased in favor of
either overprecaution or underprecaution. Therefore, I assume that when
they estimate P* they are just as likely to guess high as low. If we call
injurer estimates of P* their P's, it follows from the last assumption that
the P-distribution is a symmetric distribution whose mean is P*.
26. It is true, of course, that if an accident causing a harm of $100 occurred the plaintiff and
defendant would have little incentive to introduce much evidence at trial. But for the vast majority of
activities, the probability that an accident-any accident-will occur is quite small over the time
period in which the set of precautions in question is a sunk cost. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
once an accident takes place, the harm that is caused will be greater than the expected harm, given
that expected harm is equal to the sum of the products of actual harms and the probabilities that
accidents causing such harms will occur.
There is, however, a group of activities for which this proposition will not hold. An injurer who is
involved in very large numbers of accidents (for example, an auto manufacturer) will often estimate
expected harm before an accident with practically the same accuracy as a court after an accident.
Many injurers of this type, however, seem to be regulated by principles of products liability rather
than by principles of negligence.
27. See supra note 25.
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Finally, I assume that injurers make small errors in estimating P*.
Thus, an injurer is not uncertain that zero precaution is less than P*, nor
is he uncertain that P.. is greater than P*. He is only uncertain whether
his estimate is greater or less than P* when his estimate is between P,
and P, (a small band around p*).
28
Once an injurer has estimated P*-has selected his P-the important
social question becomes whether he will actually take the level of precau-
tion that he has estimated. The injurer is not bound to take his P under
either of the two rules. Whether the injurer actually will take the level of
precaution that he has estimated to be P* depends on the penalties he
faces when his actual choice is not equal to P*. Every liability rule creates
two kinds of penalties: a penalty for'taking more precaution than P* and
one for taking less precaution than P*. In deciding whether actually to
operate at P when he is not certain whether P is greater or less than P*,
the injurer must consider and compare the magnitudes of these penalties.
At an extreme, if the penalty for taking less precaution than P* is one
million dollars and the penalty for taking greater precaution than P* is
one cent, an injurer would never actually operate at P, his estimate of P*,
if he is at all uncertain where a court would locate P*. Instead, the injurer
would add a substantial "insurance factor" to his P estimate to minimize
the probability that the level of precaution that he ultimately takes is
lower than P*.
Although the point has never been stressed by the conventional positive
economic theory, which concludes that both liability rules will produce the
optimal result,2" the full liability and P*-cutoff rules assign very different
penalties for injurer errors, and they induce very different injurer behav-
ior under conditions of uncertainty. In fact, neither rule produces the opti-
mal behavior under these conditions. The full liability rule will frequently
induce injurers to take more precaution than P*, and the P*-cutoff rule
will frequently induce injurers to take less precaution than P*.
A. The Full Liability Rule
Suppose that an injurer has estimated P at a value that is infinitesi-
mally less than P*. If the injurer takes his P estimate as his actual pre-
caution level, the court would find that he has committed a breach of duty.
His expected liability under the full liability rule would be infinitesimally
greater than the sum of areas VI and VII. If instead an injurer takes a
28. These limits are important to the analysis here because the R-curve may not be a straight
line. If the R-curve is convex throughout its range from zero to P,,, however, it will approximate a
straight line within a small band around P*. The narrower the band of error, of course, the more the
R-curve will approximate a straight line within it.
29. See supra pp. 805-07.
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precaution level that is infinitesimally greater than P*, the loss that he
would suffer is of a different magnitude and nature. It would be merely
the infinitesimally small cost of precaution that the injurer could have
saved without being subjected to additional liability for accidents. This
"sword of Damocles" effect suggests that given a choice between one unit
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To establish this point more rigorously, consider Figure 2, which de-
picts the penalties that an injurer subject to the full liability rule faces
when he overinvests and underinvests in precaution. In this Figure, the
height of the penalty curve above the x-axis indicates the magnitude of the
penalty that the injurer will incur at given levels of precaution. By defini-
tion, at P* the value of the penalty function is zero because at this level
the injurer minimizes the sum of his precaution costs and expected liabil-
ity. If the injurer takes infinitesimally less precaution than P*, the penalty
that the injurer incurs is the value b indicated on the y-axis of Figure 2.
This value equals the sum of the areas VI and VII on Figure 1. By mov-
ing from a precaution level infinitesimally less than P* to P* itself, which
would cost the injurer only an infinitesimal amount in additional precau-
tion, the injurer saves the areas VI and VII in expected liability; thus, the
30. In fact, the actual result is even more striking. See infra pp. 811-12.
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penalty function is discontinuous.
The value b on Figure 2 is a fixed component of the penalty, which
attaches whenever an injurer operates at a precaution level less than P*.
In addition, the penalty for underinvesting also has a variable component.
At P1, an injurer faces an expected liability equal to the sum of the areas
III, IV, VI, and VII. Relative to operating at P*, however, he saves an
amount of precaution cost equal to the area IV by being at P1. Thus, the
penalty for being at P1 is the sum of areas III, VI, and VII. The area III
is the variable component of the penalty function; this component shrinks
to zero as the injurer moves from P1 to P*. In Figure 2, c is equal to the
penalty at P1; the difference between b and c equals the area III on Fig-
ure 1.31
The value of the full liability penalty function for precaution levels
greater than P* is simply the amount under the C-curve between P* and
the precaution level in question. The penalty that the injurer incurs from
being at P, is the areas V and VI on Figure 1, because the areas V and
VI are needless expense. Because courts correctly locate P*, operating at
P* itself avoids liability just as well as operating at P2. On Figure 2, the
value- of the areas V and VI is denominated a. Within the range that is
relevant to this analysis, a is always less than c, P2 imposes a lesser pen-
alty on the injurer than does P,. Thus, within this relevant range, the full
liability rule always imposes a larger penalty for underprecaution than for
overprecaution; in fact, the penalty for operating at P2 is smaller than the
penalty for operating at a level only infinitesimally less than P*.3 2
An uncertain injurer is therefore not indifferent between the two kinds
of error. To attempt to avoid the "sword of Damocles" effect of underpre-
caution, an injurer subject to the full liability rule will add an insurance
factor to his P estimate._Thus, the distribution of actual precaution choices
(which I will call the P-distribution) will be dislocated to the right of the
P distribution by an amount equal to the insurance factor.3" The most
31. The full liability penalty function is decreasing in slope (is convex) at levels of precaution less
than P*. This is so because area III has a triangular shape. On the other hand, the full liability
penalty function has a constant slope at levels of precaution greater than P* because the areas V and
VI, when combined, have a rectangular shape.
32. The value b on Figure 2 is greater than the value a because the areas VI and VII on Figure
1-the fixed component of the penalty from underprecaution-are greater than the areas V and VI,
which together constitute the penalty from the greatest possible error of overprecaution (P,). See
supra p. 809. Within the relevant range, see id., these conditions make the penalty from any injurer
error of underprecaution, no matter how small, greater than the penalty from the maximum possible
overprecaution. Given any significant doubt, the injurer strongly prefers P1 to some much smaller
level of underprecaution.
33. It is assumed that all injurers add the same insurance factor. If not, the full liability F-
distribution still will be dislocated to the right of the P-distribution and will also have a somewhat
different variance (or shape) than the P-distribution. Even with different insurance factors for differ-
ent injurers, the full liability F-distribution will still be less desirable than a P-distribution exactly
coincident to the P-distribution, so long as each injurer's insurance factor is positive. The assumption
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likely actual precaution choice (the mean of the full liability P-distribu-
tion) will not be P* itself but will be some precaution level greater than
P*.
B. The P*C-utoff Rule
The results under the P*-cutoff rule are less striking but equally im-
portant. If an injurer chooses an actual precaution level infinitesimally
lower than P*, the injurer will face liability only over an infinitesimally
small range. On the other hand, if an injurer chooses an actual precaution
level infinitesimally greater than P*, the injurer will not face any liability,
and his loss will be an infinitesimally small amount of overprecaution.
Thus, the P*-cutoff rule produces no "sword of Damocles" effect. None-
theless, the analysis of the relative penalties for underprecaution and over-
precaution is important because it reveals that under the P*-cutoff rule an
uncertain injurer will choose one unit of underprecaution over one unit of
overprecaution-the exact opposite of the behavior induced by the full lia-
bility rule. 4
In Figure 1, suppose that the injurer has taken precaution level P. At
that level, he faces liability for areas III and IV; in order to avoid this
liability he would have to incur an amount equal to area IV in additional
precaution costs. Hence, the penalty for being at P1 instead of at P* is
area III. On the other hand, if the injurer took an equal amount of over-
precaution-precaution level P2-the penalty for not being at P* would
be the sum of areas V and VI, which is the amount spent in useless addi-
tional precaution. Because areas III and V are equal, an injurer given the
choice between operating at P1 or P2 will pick P1, and thereby save an
amount equal to area VI. More generally, one can say that an uncertain
injurer faced with the P*-cutoff rule will prefer a given amount of under-
precaution over an equal amount of overprecaution.
Figure 3, which depicts the penalty function for the P*-cutoff rule, il-
lustrates two noteworthy results. First, there is no discontinuity in the
value of the penalty function at P*, as there was for the full liability rule.
Second, consistent with the prior reasoning, the magnitude of the penalty
that each injurer's insurance factor is the same seems to follow both from the assumption that all
injurers are risk neutral, which is a standard assumption in the conventional theory, see supra note
23, and from the absence of an a priori reason to assume that people engaging in the same activity
(building the same-sized dam) would entertain very different judgments about the probability that
their estimates of P* would be wrong. Indeed, the estimates of P* made by different injurers will be
subject to similar costs and rewards.
34. The result under the P*-cutoff rule is less striking than that under the full liability rule,
where any overprecaution in the relevant ranges is more desirable than any underprecaution. See
supra note 32.
The P*-cutoff penalty function decreases in slope at levels below P* and has constant slope at levels
above P*. See supra note 31.
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for underprecaution (the height of the penalty function at any precaution
level) is always less than that for an equal amount of overprecaution. In
Figure 3, the value d-the penalty from being at P 1-is equal to the area
III on Figure 1. The value a, once again, is equal to the areas V and VI
in Figure 1.
Figure 3
Under the P*-cutoff rule, an individual estimating P* under conditions
of uncertainty will have the same P distribution as he would under the
full liability rule. This time, though, when he is making his decision
about what precaution level to take, he does not add an insurance factor to
his P estimate; instead, being aware that underprecaution imposes a lower
penalty than overprecaution, he subtracts a "low ball" factor. In doing so,
the injurer assumes that he is better off by underinvesting more than half
of the time and overinvesting less than half of the time; therefore, he takes
a level of precaution less than his estimate of P*. The distribution of ac-
tual precaution choices produced by these unequal penalties, P, will be
dislocated to the left of the P-distribution. The mean of actual precaution
choices will be less than P*, even though the mean of injurer estimates is
exactly P*.
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III. The New Theory
The preceding critique of the conventional positive theory of negligence
demonstrates that the major claim of that theory-that the P*-comparison
test promotes minimum social cost-does not hold under the very realistic
assumption that injurers will not always be able correctly to identify P*.
It is important to emphasize that in making the critique, I did not assume
that injurers are incapable of ascertaining P*. I merely assumed that in
attempting to find P* injurers will sometimes make mistakes. I conceded,
however, that these mistakes would be random and symmetrically distrib-
uted around P*. These specifications are not radically different from those
of the conventional model, 5 a fact that makes the critique all the more
striking. First, random errors by injurers do not produce random varia-
tions in the level of precaution, but systematic variations. Second, the two
rules that have so far coexisted in the conventional theory with little atten-
tion having been paid to their difference 6 lead to dramatically different
results. As an alternative to both rules, I propose a new formal theory,
which I will call the cost-benefit approach. This theory retains the concept
of legal causation of the P*-cutoff rule, but defines breach of duty in a
manner altogether different from the P*-comparison approach. Under
conditions of uncertainty, the new theory leads to results that are more
socially desirable than those produced by its conventional counterparts.
A. The Cost-Benefit Approach
Under the P*-comparison approach, courts determine breach of duty by
comparing an injurer's actual level of precaution to P*. If actual precau-
35. See supra note 25.
36. See supra pp. 809-13. In their most recent article, Landes and Posner seem to argue that their
formulation of the P*-cutoff rule was always implicit in "the economist's" theory of negligence, even
in its full liability form. They analyze Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S.W. 809 (1898), in
which the court found that, although the defendant committed a breach of duty by failing to install
fire escapes, he was not liable because fire escapes would not have prevented the decedent's death.
Landes & Posner, Causation, supra note 3, at 116-17. This case seems scarcely explainable if courts
are adopting the full liability rule. Nonetheless, Landes & Posner argue that "the economist" would
have been right all along to think of McNulty as a case in which there was no negligence. As they
reason:
Now there may seem an element of paradox in asserting that McNulty was not really
negligent, when the premise of the court's decision was that he had been negligent per se but
should be excused for want of a causal relationship between negligence and injury. But this
just shows that the courts do in two steps what the economist, via the refined version of the
Hand formula, does in one. The court first asks whether there is negligence in a rather crude
sense, a failure to do something which in the general run of cases would be socially cost
justified and then, under the rubric of causation, inquires whether the taking of additional care
would have been socially cost justified in the particular circumstances of the case, given other
factors that may have made additional care fruitless.
Id. at 116. This account of why the differences between the P*-cutoff rule and the full liability rule
were not noticed seems to be an over-simplification.
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tion is less than P* there is a breach of duty; if actual precaution is at
least equal to P*, there is no breach of duty. Suppose, instead, that courts
listen to allegations of untaken precautions-for example, the failure to
build a 120-foot wall on a dam, the failure to place a fence around a
swimming pool, or the failure to station a lifeguard on a beachfront-and
find an injurer negligent whenever the costs of at least one specific un-
taken precaution are less than the reduction in expected harm that would
have resulted from that precaution. They would then impose liability if
the specific act of negligence used to prove the breach of duty was the
cause in fact of the harm the victims suffered-that is, when but for the
failure to take the particular precaution constituting the defendant's
breach of duty the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred.
Although one might at first imagine that this cost-benefit approach is
really the same as the P*-comparison approach, there are some significant
differences between them. The most important difference between the two
approaches is that under the cost-benefit approach the maximum level of
untaken precaution that can be used to show breach of duty is not fixed,
but depends on the injurer's actual level of precaution. For example, if the
injurer is taking precaution level P1, the plaintiff can point to any precau-
tion level smaller than P2 and successfully argue that the injurer's failure
to have taken that precaution level was a breach of duty. This result fol-
lows easily from Figure 1. Because P1 and P2 are equidistant from P*,
area III is equal to area V and area IV is equal to the sum of areas V and
VI. It follows that areas IV, V and VI (the additional costs of taking P 2)
are exactly equal to areas IV, III and VI (the additional benefits from
taking P 2). For any precaution level smaller than P2, the additional bene-
fits outweigh the additional costs. On the other hand, if the injurer's ac-
tual precaution is not P,, but instead a level infinitesimally smaller than
P*, the maximum untaken precaution that the plaintiff could use to prove
breach of duty would be an amount infinitesimally greater than p.
3 7
Thus, as the injurer takes less precaution, he creates more opportunities
37. The cost-benefit approach is a theory about specific negligence cases. Res ipsa loquitur cases,
which are beyond the scope of the conventional theory, are also beyond the scope of this Article. There
is no clear line of demarcation between res ipsa and specific negligence cases, because the difference
between them depends on the degree to which the plaintiff proves negligence using particular untaken
precautions. The clearest case of specific negligence is where the plaintiff offers a highly defined
untaken precaution as proof of the breach of duty (the failure to build the dam wall 120 feet high).
The clearest case of res ipsa loquitur (or general negligence as it was once called) is where the
plaintiff offers no particular untaken precaution to prove the breach of duty (the dam was within the
exclusive control of the defendant, dams do not ordinarily overflow in the absence of negligence, and
so forth). The middle case is where the plaintiff alleges negligence in very general terms (the failure
to operate and maintain the dam using due care). Depending on whether the proof uncovers a partic-
ular untaken precaution that might constitute a breach of duty, this middle kind of case is properly
seen either as a res ipsa case or as a specific negligence case, or as one that went to the jury on
alternative theories.
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for the victim to show a breach of duty. In this sense, the cost-benefit
approach permits alternative proofs of breach of duty, and the levels of
untaken precaution available for the victim's proof increase as the in-
jurer's actual precaution decreases. In contrast, under the P*-comparison
standard the maximum untaken precaution that the victim can use to
prove breach of duty is P*, regardless of whether the injurer is at P1 or a
precaution level infinitesimally less than P*, and negligence can never be
premised on the failure to take a precaution level greater than P*.
This new cost-benefit approach shares an important feature with the
conventional approach. If an injurer is operating at least at level P*, he
cannot be found negligent under either approach. From the geometry of
Figure 1, it is clear that the cost of any precaution beyond P* will always
be higher than the corresponding reduction in expected harm.
Why would the victim ever want to prove the breach of duty with an
untaken precaution beyond P*? If the injurer had been operating at a
level slightly over P1, why not prove that the breach of duty was the fail-
ure to take P*? It should be easier to prove that the failure to take P* was
a breach of duty than it would be to show that the injurer was negligent
because he failed to operate at P,. The benefits of taking P* instead of a
little more precaution than P1 exceed the additional costs by a significant
amount (area III). In contrast, the benefits of taking P2 are only infinitesi-
mally greater than the increase in costs. Why go to the limit?
By merely proving that the injurer was negligent by failing to operate
at P*, the plaintiff might fail to prove legal causation. Suppose on Figure
1 that P1 is a 110-foot wall for a dam, P* is a 120-foot wall, and P2 is a
130-foot wall. Suppose also that the plaintiff's property floods and that
this flood could have been prevented only by a wall at least 125 feet high.
If the victim establishes breach of duty with the dam owner's failure to
build a 120-foot wall (P*), the victim will fail on the cause in fact issue.
The court will say, "It may be true as you say that the defendant was
negligent in failing to build the wall up to 120 feet, but you have not
shown that a 120-foot wall would have prevented the harm that actually
occurred, and therefore you have failed to prove that the defendant's neg-
ligence was the cause in fact of that harm.""8 To avoid losing the case on
38. As the court said in City of Piqua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, 54, 120 N.E. 300, 303 (1918),
which was a dam overflow case:
An apt illustration which has been suggested is that if a river levee had been maintained at the
height of 10 feet and the custodians of the levee had been warned that flood waters might
require a levee 16 feet in height, and they neglected to so increase the height of the levee, and
an unprecedented flood should ensue, during which it should appear that a levee 26 feet in
height would not have held the flood waters, the parties responsible for the levee would not be
liable for negligence in failing to maintain a 16-foot levee, when a 26-foot levee would have
been unavailing.
In other words, the plaintiff must pick an untaken precaution level sufficiently high so that it would
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the cause in fact issue, the plaintiff must carry a heavier burden on the
breach of duty issue.39 In particular, the plaintiff must show that the fail-
ure to build the wall up to some height higher than 125 feet was a breach
of duty. Only this more ambitious proof of the breach of duty issue will
satisfy the cause in fact requirement.
The "zone" of liability created by the cost-benefit rule, that is, by join-
ing the cost-benefit approach to breach of duty with the but-for cause in
fact requirement, is different than that of the two rules of the conventional
theory. Under the cost-benefit rule, an injurer operating at P1 faces ex-
pected liability in the areas III, IV, and VI. By contrast, under the P*-
cutoff rule, he would face liability only in areas III and IV; under the full
liability rule, the areas of expected liability are III, IV, VI, and VII.
B. Evaluating the Cost-Benefit Approach
Under conditions of certainty, the cost-benefit rule, like the P*-cutoff
and full liability rules, leads to the socially optimal level of precaution. An
individual would not operate above P* under the cost-benefit rule, because
doing so would not reduce his expected liability, but would result in addi-
tional precaution costs. Consider, however, the possibility that he might
operate at P1, a level below P*. There, his expected liability would be the
sum of areas III, IV, and VI. By expending an amount equal to area IV
in additional precaution, the injurer can escape all liability. Thus, he will
never intentionally operate at P1 . A similar exercise will rule out all other
values less than P*.
Now, consider the case of uncertainty. Uncertainty acquires a slightly
different meaning under the cost-benefit approach to breach of duty, be-
cause this approach assumes that courts are not in the express business of
locating P*. Instead, under the cost-benefit approach courts are judging
whether at particular actual levels of precaution, the costs of further pre-
cautions are greater or less than the benefits. If courts make no mis-
takes-the same assumption as before-they will locate the least-cost pre-
caution level that will preclude the victim from showing a breach of duty
at P*. Therefore, although courts do not expressly locate P*, they behave
as if they did. The injurer, as before, can make mistakes. In searching for
the least-cost precaution level that will preclude the showing of a breach
of duty, P*, he can incorrectly estimate the R-curve or the C-curve. For
example, the injurer's pre-accident notions of expected harm may be dif-
ferent from the estimates that he would have made if he had access to
have prevented the particular harm that he sustained. And, he must prove that this same untaken
precaution was a breach of duty, given the defendant's actual level of precaution.
39. This tension between the breach of duty and cause-in-fact issues is apparent in Stacy v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614, 54 N.W. 1091 (1893).
The Yale Law Journal
post-trial information. Similarly, he may decide not to build a higher dam,
under the impression that the additional cost is greater than the additional
benefit, and then find out at trial that new technology available before the
dam was built would have made a higher wall cheaper than he had origi-
nally thought.
Under uncertainty, the cost-benefit rule has more desirable properties
than the conventional rules because it does not create incentives for under-
precaution or overprecaution. An injurer operating at P1 under the cost-
benefit approach faces expected liability in areas III, IV, and VI in Fig-
ure 1. If, instead, he operated at P*, he would pay an amount equal to
area IV in additional precaution, but face no liability. Thus, the penalty
from operating at underprecaution P1 is equal to the sum of areas III and
VI. On the other hand, the penalty from operating at P2 instead of P* is
equal to the areas V and VI, just as it is under the two other rules. Under
all three rules, P* will avoid liability just as P2 will, so the areas V and
VI always represent an expense for needless precaution. What is different
about the cost-benefit rule is that it alone makes the penalties from over-
precaution and underprecaution equal. When P, and P2 are equal but
opposite errors, the sum of the areas III and VI (the penalty for under-
precaution) exactly equals the sum of the areas V and VI (the penalty for
overprecaution), since areas III and V are congruent triangles.
Another way to see the advantages of the cost-benefit rule is illustrated
by Figure 4. There, because the penalty for underprecaution is exactly the
same as the penalty for equal overprecaution, both parts of the cost-bene-
fit rule penalty function have equal (but opposite) slopes. 0 Also, unlike
the full-liability penalty function, the cost-benefit penalty function has no
discontinuity at P*. These equal penalties for the two kinds of error have
a highly desirable implication for the way that an injurer will approach
the question of whether to take the precaution level that he has estimated
to be P*. Indeed, once the injurer has made his P estimate, he has no
incentive under the cost-benefit rule either to add an insurance factor or to
subtract a low ball factor. He is indifferent between opposite but equal
errors. Therefore, he will estimate his P and take precisely the amount of
his estimate, without biasing his actual precaution choice in either
direction.
40. The slopes of the two wings on the cost-benefit rule penalty function are both constant be-
cause underprecaution and overprecaution each produce penalties in rectangular (not triangular) ar-
eas. Therefore, the penalty for any given increment of error is always the same.
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The social consequences of the three alternative negligence rules can be
seen on Figure 5. Each rule operates against the same P-distribution-the
same set of injurer estimates of P*. This P-distribution is the middle one,
because under the prior assumption injurers are just as likely to estimate
P* high or low, whatever the liability rule. Under the P*-cutoff rule, in-
jurers' actual precaution choices will be dislocated toward lower levels of
precaution, because each injurer is subtracting a low ball factor from his
estimate of P*, taking an amount of precaution equal to his estimate less
the low ball factor. Under the full liability rule, the P-distribution also
will not be actually realized because injurers are adding an insurance fac-
tor to their estimates of P*, taking an amount of precaution that equals
their P estimates plus the insurance factor. Hence, each of these two rules
produces an actual distribution of precaution, P, that is dislocated from
the P-distribution. In contrast, the distribution of actual precaution
choices induced by the cost-benefit rule is exactly the same as the P-distri-
bution. The dislocated P-distribution produced by the full liability rule
might be socially preferable to the alternatives if society lost more from
errors of underprecaution than from equal errors of overprecaution. Simi-
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larly, the P distribution of the P*-cutoff rule might be preferable if society
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Society, however, loses the same amount from underprecaution as from
equal overprecaution." When the injurer is at P1, society foregoes an
amount equal to the area III, which represents a possible surplus that
society has lost. Similarly, when the injurer is at P2, society loses the area
V, which represents a deficit that society has incurred. Within a range of
error around P* where the C- and R-curves can be assumed to be linear,
these two areas are equal.42 Thus, society is indifferent between errors of
underprecaution and equal errors of overprecaution. In addition, because
the area of triangles similar to III and V is proportional to the square of
the departure from P*, the social loss function is proportional to the sum
of the squares of the departures of actual precaution levels from P*. For
example, one injurer error that is double another injurer error costs soci-
ety four times as much. As Figure 5 indicates, for any given P-distribution
41. Thus, the private terms of trade between the two types of errors under the cost-benefit ap-
proach are the same as the social terms of trade.
42. See supra note 28.
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of the type previously assumed, society is better off if the P-distribution
generated by a legal rule is the same as the P-distribution than if it is
shifted away from the P-distribution. The P-distribution crowds more
precaution choices close to P*, the region in which society loses least, than
the alternative distributions depicted in Figure 5. Society loses least under
the cost-benefit rule because the P-distribution generated by that rule is
equal to the P-distribution. Society does not prefer the full liability P-
distribution because it is dislocated to the right of the P-distribution. By
the same token, society does not prefer the P*-cutoff P-distribution be-
cause it is dislocated to the left of the P-distribution. Hence, the cost-
benefit rule has better formal properties than the rules of the coventional
theory.
IV. The New Theory and the Courts
The preceding discussion shows that the cost-benefit approach can pro-
vide a desirable alternative to the formal economic model that underlies
the conventional positive theory of negligence. This part shows that the
cost-benefit approach is also a more practical one for courts to implement,
and that it is more consistent with the way courts actually decide specific
negligence cases than either of the two other rules. Thus, from an empiri-
cal standpoint, it provides a better basis for positive analysis.
A. The Informational Requirements of the Competing Approaches
In determining whether a party has acted negligently and should be
liable, courts consider certain types of information. The next section
shows that the evidence generally before the courts concerns the costs and
expected benefits of specific untaken precautions. This information is suf-
ficient to determine the issue of negligence under the cost-benefit rule. As
we have seen, under that rule a party is held liable if the cost of an un-
taken precaution that would have prevented the accident is smaller than
the reduction in expected harm that would have resulted from taking that
precaution. Under the cost-benefit approach, this condition is necessary
and sufficient for a finding of liability." ' It can be called the "cost-benefit
condition."
Under the P*-cutoff rule the corresponding liability conditions are far
more complex. In Figure 1, consider the case of an injurer who has built a
111-foot wall (one foot more than P,). The property downstream is
flooded, and the property owner can prove that the overflow would have
been prevented by constructing a 130-foot wall (P2), but cannot show that
43. This condition will hold provided that proximate cause, duty, and defenses arising from the
plaintiff's conduct are not a problem. All of these matters are beyond the scope of this Article.
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the overflow would have been prevented by building a 120-foot wall (P*).
From the geometry of Figure 1, it follows that the plaintiff will prevail
under the cost-benefit rule. Under the P*-cutoff rule, however, the court
would find for defendant. Thus, the cost-benefit condition is not sufficient
for a finding of liability under the P*-cutoff rule. If courts actually apply
the P*-cutoff rule, then after the plaintiff satisfies the cost-benefit condi-
tion they must allow the defendant to raise the defense that the accident
would have occurred even if the level of precaution had been P*. This
defense appears to be missing in negligence law. If it were available, one
would expect that it would be a routine feature of negligence litigation,
because when the defendant has taken less precaution than P* there will
always be precautions beyond P* that satisfy the cost-benefit condition.
I know of only one case in which a defendant tried to make an argu-
ment similar to the missing defense, and in that case the court rejected the
argument. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel," a statute provided that swim-
ming pool managers should either post a sign saying that there was no
lifeguard or else provide a lifeguard. Because posting a sign would have
precluded liability under the statute, this precaution level has at least a
plausible claim for being considered P*, particularly since it is improbable
that any precaution as great as providing a lifeguard could be considered
to minimize social costs in a motel swimming pool during the off-season
time when the accident occurred.4 On the cause-in-fact issue, the plaintiff
was able to show with much greater force that a lifeguard, rather than a
mere warning sign, would have prevented the drowning of her husband
and son. The defendant, following a tack very similar to the missing de-
fense, argued that because posting the sign would have precluded the
showing of a breach, liability should be tested not by whether a lifeguard
would have prevented the deaths-as plaintiff wanted-but by whether a
sign would have prevented the deaths. The California Supreme Court re-
jected the argument. This case, which presented an alternative statutory
duty, would seem to provide the most favorable setting for the missing
defense to be accepted. In this case, unlike most that would arise in the
absence of a statute, it was obvious that if the defendant had taken a
precaution level less than the one that the plaintiff had actually used to
44. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
45. Of course, P* will frequently not be a single precaution. In almost all cases, P* will be a set
of precautions that would be optimal with respect to a particular expected harm or "reasonably fore-
seeable risk." See supra note 10. With respect to the risk that people may drown in a motel swimming
pool during the off-season, the optimal set of precautions would probably include posting a sign that
no lifeguard was on duty, having lifesaving equipment nearby, cleaning up any grease that might get
onto the pool deck, and so forth. The argument made in the text that it is unlikely that posting a
lifeguard at the pool "is P" is shorthand for saying that it is unlikely that this precaution is within
the set of various precautions (and associated levels of each) that together constitute the P* set of
precautions.
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prove the breach of duty, the plaintiff would have been foreclosed from
showing the breach of duty that she did show. When the Haft court re-
jected the defendant's argument, it rejected the missing defense in a setting
most conducive to the defense's success. If this defense existed, the case
reports would be filled with its refinements and successes because injurers
would frequently wish to rely on it. Instead, the defense that has just been
described truly is missing and seems rejected.
Another way that courts could cut off liability at P* would be to impose
some ceiling on the victim's selection of untaken precautions. This ceiling
would have to be more restrictive than the cost-benefit condition. One pos-
sible ceiling would be custom. Under this restriction, only customary pre-
cautions could be alleged to be the breach of duty, even in situations
where it appears that the costs of uncustomary precautions were less than
their benefits. Yet, courts have long held that in most areas of negligence
liability the mere compliance with custom is no defense to the injurer
whose breach of duty is predicated on cost-benefit considerations.48
46. E.g., Texas & P. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903); Wabash Ry. v. McDaniels, 107
U.S. 454, 460-61 (1882); Bahamas Agricultural Indus., Ltd. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 526 F.2d 1174,
1178 (6th Cir. 1975); Princemont Constr. Corp. v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1217, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Klein v.
Mr. Transmission, Inc., 294 Ala. 437, 441-42, 318 So. 2d 676, 679-80 (1975); Roberie v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 252 So. 2d 488, 493 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Thompson v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 9 Ohio St.
2d 116, 117-19, 224 N.E.2d 131, 134-35 (1967).
The one exception to this principle is medical and possibly other forms of malpractice. In most
jurisdictions, the victim injured by a doctor must demonstrate that the untaken precaution used to
establish the doctor's breach of duty was customary among doctors. Tant v. Women's Clinic, 382 So.
2d 1120, 1121 (Ala. 1980); Walton v. Jones, 286 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. 1979); see King, In
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28
VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1234-35 (1975); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REV. 549, 605-06 (1959). But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
(finding breach of duty of physician based on uncustomary precaution). For discussions of other types
of malpractice, see Kenney v. Oak Builders, Inc., 224 So. 2d 161, 168 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (archi-
tects); Lambert v. Soltis, 422 Pa. 304, 307-10, 221 A.2d 173, 175-77 (1966) (dentists); Elizondo v.
Tavarez, 596 S.W.2d 667, 672-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (nurses).
The precautions customary among doctors have a good claim for being considered P*, because most
doctors would have every expectation that their patients would wish to pay for all precautions whose
costs are less than their benefits and, if their patients are risk neutral, for no more. There is a good
reason for the law to subject doctors to the P*-cutoff rule, as opposed to the cost-benefit rule. By
virtue of his special kind of relationship with his patient, who is the possible victim of his negligence,
the doctor faces a penalty function very different from that of most injurers. For the doctor the penalty
from being at P, is the sum of the areas III and IV, not just the area III, because if the doctor is ever
found at P, he will have the unhappy awareness that his patient would have been willing to pay the
area IV for him to have taken P* instead. (In this scenario, the C-curve includes a competitive rate of
return for the doctor on the medical procedures that he sells.) On the other hand, if the doctor takes
P,, he can recover the area VI in fee even from a perfectly informed patient. Therefore, the doctor's
penalty from being at P, is at most the area V. For the doctor, then, and possibly for other injurers
with similar special relationships to their victims, even the P*-cutoff rule imposes a higher penalty for
underprecaution than for equal overprecaution. If courts applied the cost-benefit rule to this peculiar
situation, they would further imbalance the penalties for the two types of errors, because the penalty
for operating at P, would become the areas III, IV, and VI. It is presumably for this reason that the
courts apply a standard more similar to the P*-cutoff rule to this special situation. The conventional
theory does not make this distinction, but maintains instead that the P*-comparison approach is the
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If courts adopted the full liability rule we would not observe them ask-
ing whether the defendant's breach of duty was the but-for cause of the
plaintiff's harm. They would be asking instead whether the kind of pre-
caution that the plaintiff failed to take (higher walls) was causally linked
to the plaintiff's harm. In other words, if the plaintiff proved that the
failure to raise the wall from 110 feet to 112 feet was a breach of duty,
the defendant would be liable for the harm done by a 135-foot flood, even
though the cost of the additional precaution that would have prevented the
accident is greater than the corresponding reduction in expected harm.
Thus, the cost-benefit condition cannot be a necessary condition for a find-
ing of liability under the full liability rule. Under this rule, a plaintiff
could make an alternative argument and prevail. That argument would
contain the following elements: (1) a showing that the reduction in ex-
pected harm from any given untaken precaution, no matter how small,
exceeds its cost; and (2) a showing that the harm sustained resulted from
the defendant's activity. 47 Under the full liability rule, the plaintiff does
not have to show that the untaken precaution used to satisfy the breach of
duty requirement also satisfies the cause in fact requirement by being one
that would have prevented the particular harm that the plaintiff sustained.
In summary, to justify the P*-cutoff rule, its proponents need to show
that courts apply the defense that shields a negligent defendant from lia-
bility for untaken precautions beyond P*, even if such untaken precau-
tions satisfy the cost-benefit condition. To justify the full liability rule they
need to show that the cost-benefit comparison need not involve the actual
untaken precaution that would have prevented the accident. In contrast to
both these cases, a proponent of the cost-benefit approach need show only
that courts compare the costs and benefits of particular untaken precau-
tions to determine breach of duty and predicate cause in fact on the ability
of the untaken precaution constituting the breach of duty to have pre-
vented the harm that the plaintiff sustained.
B. Cost-Benefit Comparisons and the Case Law
In a recent article, William Landes and Richard Posner examine a set
of cases with the view of defending the P*-comparison approach." These
cases can be divided into two groups: cases on negligence reprinted in the
Gregory, Kalven, and Epstein torts casebook,' 9 thought by Landes and
general rule of breach of duty.
47. In other words, using the formulation given at supra note 11, the sole causal issue would be
whether the harm sustained arose from a reasonably foreseeable risk.
48. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 892-903.
49. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 102-30 (3d ed.
1977); see Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 899-903.
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Posner to be neutral with respect to their theory; and their own personal
selections, which may have been chosen to validate the P*-comparison
theory.50 For the sake of brevity, the analysis here focuses on Landes and
Posner's own selection of injurer negligence cases,51 because those cases
are the ones that one would expect would support the conventional theory
most strongly. But even this latter group of cases provides better support
for the hypothesis that courts are using the cost-benefit approach.
It should be noted that Landes and Posner performed this case analysis
before they clarified their theory of legal causation. In the article in which
the case analysis appears, there is no explicit formal theory of how the
cause in fact doctrine limits liability; the formal model relates solely to the
breach of duty doctrine, which they model using the P*-comparison ap-
proach. 52 Their more recent clarification of their causation theory explic-
itly adds the concept of but-for causation to their formal model of the
negligence rule.53 Hence, Landes and Posner seem now committed to the
P*-cutoff rule and not to the full liability rule. In any event, as the fol-
lowing discussion indicates, the cases that they selected to validate their
theory clearly do not support the hypothesis that courts are using the full
liability rule.54 Therefore, the relevant question becomes whether these
cases better support the hypothesis that courts are using the P*-cutoff rule
or the hypothesis that courts are using the cost-benefit rule.
In Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 55 the first case from the Landes and
Posner selection, the plaintiff, who was a minor, was seriously injured
while swimming in the defendant's abandoned strip mine. Consistent with
the cost-benefit approach to the breach of duty issue, the court was clear
that of the various untaken precautions that the plaintiff had demon-
strated, the one constituting the defendant's breach of duty was the de-
fendant's failure to build a "six-foot high steel chain-link fence with steel
posts set in concrete surrounding the entire pit.""6 The court noted that
this steel fence would have cost between $12,000 and $14,000, but con-
cluded that "[t]his cost was slight compared to the risk to the children
involved."'57 The court seemed convinced that this precaution, if it had
been taken, would have virtually eliminated the relevant expected harm,
so a conclusion that the cost was less than the "risk" was tantamount to a
50. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 899.
51. I do not consider Liming v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N.W. 66 (1890), which is a
contributory negligence case, and therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
52. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 874, 882.
53. Landes & Posner, Causation, supra note 3, at 115-18.
54. In none of the cases is the analysis consistent with the "causal link" theory of causation. See
supra p. 824.
55. 115 Ill. App. 2d 35, 253 N.E.2d 56 (1969); see Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 892-93.
56. 115 Il. App. 2d at 39, 253 N.E.2d at 58.
57. Id. at 45, 253 N.E.2d at 61.
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conclusion that the additional cost was less than the reduction in expected
harm.
It would be unreasonable to infer from the Hendricks court's opinion a
specific finding that the six-foot steel fence set in concrete was necessarily
within the set of social-cost-minimizing precautions. The court also laid
emphasis on the defendant's failure either to post signs warning of the
danger or to police the area effectively. Presumably, some combination of
signs and very effective policing would have precluded the plaintiff from
showing that the absence of the fence was a breach of duty. What combi-
nation of precaution technologies would minimize social cost is something
that cases like Hendricks do not decide. All Hendricks decided was that,
given the defendant's actual level of precaution, the costs of building a
fence would have been less than the reduction in expected harm from do-
ing so and that a fence would have prevented the particular injury that
occurred. This limited finding of fact would conclude the liability issue if
the court were following the cost-benefit approach; if the court were fol-
lowing the P*-comparison approach, however, the analysis would be far
more complicated, since the court would have to determine what combina-
tion of these three-and possibly other-precaution technologies would
truly minimize social cost.
Adams v. Bullock,5" the second case that Landes and Posner discuss, is
also one in which the court seems to have been using the cost-benefit ap-
proach. Here the court narrowed the possibilities of what untaken precau-
tions might support liability by using cause in fact analysis. The plaintiff
was a boy who was shocked when the wire that he was swinging while
walking on a bridge came into contact with the defendant's trolley wires.
The court noted that "[g]uards [for wires] . . . are of little value."159 What
the court meant was that if the defendant had placed the guards "here and
there" on the wires, it is doubtful that it would have prevented the partic-
ular harm that the plaintiff sustained. 0 The only untaken precaution that
would have satisfied the cause in fact requirement was placing the trolley
wires underground. If they had been underground, the plaintiff's harm
would have been prevented, because his swinging wire would surely not
have come into contact with them. The court was not satisfied "upon the
facts exhibited in this record" that the cost of placing the wires under-
58. 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (1919); see Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 893-94.
59. 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94.
60. A similar, but harder, cause in fact issue is presented when the defendant has failed to place
fire escapes on a building. Granting this omission to be a breach of duty, courts have denied recovery
because of a failure to demonstrate cause in fact. See, e.g., Rosser v. Atlantic Trust & Sec. Co., 168
Va. 389, 191 S.E. 651 (1937); Berry v. Farmers' Exch., 286 P. 46 (Wash. 1930). To prove cause in
fact, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that if a fire escape had been built, it would have been positioned
in a way to have allowed the plaintiff (or the plaintiff's deceased) to have escaped.
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ground was justified by the benefits.6 There is no suggestion in this case
that liability depends on any condition more restrictive than the cost-bene-
fit condition, as would be the case if the court were using the P*-cutoff
rule.
In the next case that Landes and Posner discuss, Nussbaum v.
Lacopo,62 the plaintiff, who had bought a house next to a golf course, was
struck by a ball that the defendant had hit.63 The court analyzed two
untaken precautions, again in the alternative: The defendant's failure to
take more care in making his shot to prevent the golf ball from hooking,
and the defendant's failure to shout "Fore!" once he knew it had hooked.
The court decided that the first untaken precaution did not constitute a
breach of duty. The court noted that "[g]olfers are notorious in the tedious
preparation they give to a shot."6 So, it was unlikely that the cost to the
defendant of further precaution in striking the ball would have been less
than the reduction in expected harm, especially when the defendant could
see that there was a natural barrier of foliage between the tee and the
plaintiff's property. In any event, as the court also noted, "Plaintiff made
no effort to show that defendant failed to use due care in striking the
ball."6 5 In the court's mind, this resolved the issue on the first untaken
precaution in favor of the defendant.
What consumes most of the court's analysis and what the court obvi-
ously regarded as the most serious breach of duty issue of the case arose
on the second untaken precaution, namely, the defendant's failure to have
shouted "Fore!" once he knew that he had hooked the ball. Landes and
Posner do not mention this issue in their analysis. Of course, normally the
burden of shouting "Fore!" after a seriously hooked shot is less than the
reduction in expected harm. The court, however, refused to send the case
to the jury, stating: "Living so close to a golf course, plaintiff would neces-
sarily hear numerous warning shouts each day. As the warning would
ordinarily be directed to other golfers, plaintiff could be expected to ignore
them."166 In other words, even if the failure to have taken the precaution
of shouting "Fore!" was a breach of duty, it could not have been the cause
61. 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94.
62. 27 N.Y.2d 311, 265 N.E.2d 762, 317 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970); see Landes & Posner, supra note
1, at 894-95.
63. Actually there were two defendants, the golfer and the golf course. The untaken precaution
alleged against the golf course was its failure to design the course in a way that would reduce the
expected harm to those in and around the plaintiff's home. The court resolved this issue with assump-
tion-of-the-risk analysis, saying the evidence was that golf balls only occasionally landed on the plain-
tiff's property and that "[t]hese invasions are the annoyances which must be accepted by one who
seeks to reside in the serenity and semi-isolation of such pastoral setting." 27 N.Y.2d at 317, 265
N.E.2d at 765, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
64. Id. at 319, 265 N.E.2d at 767, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
65. Id. at 318, 265 N.E.2d at 766-67, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
66. Id. at 318, 265 N.E.2d at 766, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
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in fact of the plaintiff's harm because this precaution would not have pre-
vented the plaintiff's harm, even if it had been taken. Thus, the court's
refusal to send the case to the jury was premised on a "cause in fact"
reason, not a "breach of duty" reason.67 Because the cost-benefit rule has
the same cause in fact requirement as the P*-cutoff rule, this case is no
more consistent with the P*-comparison approach than it is with the cost-
benefit approach, except, of course, that this case does not suggest the
existence of the "missing defense" or any other condition of liability more
restrictive than the cost-benefit condition.
In these injurer negligence cases that Landes and Posner marshal in
support of their P*-comparison theory, the issue that the courts considered
was not whether actual precaution was less than the P*-level but whether
the cost of at least one specific untaken precaution was less than the bene-
fit. Indeed, at points in their analysis, Landes and Posner write as if they
are really trying to validate the cost-benefit approach, not their P*-com-
parison theory. For example, in their discussion of Blyth v. Proprietors of
67. Landes and Posner make the same error relative to McDowall v. Great W. Ry., [19031 2
K.B. 331 (C.A.) (Vaughan Williams, L.J.), rev'g 11902] 1 K.B. 618, a Gregory, Kalven and Epstein
case, which was also finally decided by the Court of Appeal on cause in fact or proximate cause
grounds, not on breach of duty grounds as Landes and Posner write. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 1, at 901-02, In this case, a group of boys broke into one of the defendant's boxcars and sent it
rolling down a hill where it crashed into the plaintiff. The defendant's actual level of precaution was
high in that the defendant had (1) locked the boxcar, (2) left it braked, and (3) left it coupled to other
railcars. The untaken precaution that the plaintiff alleged to be the breach of duty was the defendant's
failure to have set the boxcar behind a "catchpoint" as the defendant easily could have done. Because
the defendant's actual level of precaution was high, it is doubtful that setting the boxcar behind the
catchpoint would have reduced expected harm by any significant amount. The jury found in a special
verdict, however, that it was a breach of duty to have failed to set the boxcar behind the catchpoint,
and the King's Bench Division entered judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal
reversed, and it is this reversal that Landes and Posner are trying to explain. They say that the Court
of Appeal found that the evidence of the defendant's breach of duty was insufficient to support the
verdict, and that this finding was justified because after all the actual precautions had been taken the
marginal reduction in expected harm was "probably negative," suggesting that it would have been
inefficient to make even a negligible expenditure to move the car behind the catchpoint. Landes &
Posner, supra note 1, at 907. Landes and Posner's analysis implies that the defendant had taken
precaution up to the point where the last units of precaution were actually increasing expected harm.
This conclusion seems unlikely. Surely, braking the boxcar, if that was the last unit of precaution,
would not have increased expected harm. Rather, the Court of Appeal seems to have decided the case
on cause in fact, not breach of duty, grounds. As the court noted in a key passage:
The truth of the matter is that, if it had been placed there [behind the catchpoint], all these
boys would have had to do was to open or close, as the case might be, this catch-point and let
the van go by, which would have been a very much simpler operation than that they went
through when they got into the van, of uncoupling and unbraking the van.
2 K.B. at 336-37. This means that the court found that there was no cause in fact because the
untaken precaution said to constitute the breach of duty would not, under the circumstances, have
prevented the particular accident that occurred. In a later passage, the court makes this point even
more clearly: "[I1n my judgment, there is nothing to justify the finding that the not placing the van to
the east of the catch-point was an effective cause of the accident which occurred." Id. at 337. The
other decisional language in the opinion bears on whether the intervention of the boys should have
been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, which is proximate cause analysis outside the scope of
this Article.
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the Birmingham Waterworks,68 Landes and Posner write:
The court was not interested in whether the total costs of burying
the main to a depth at which it would not have burst even in the
unusually severe frost of 1855 were less than the expected accident
costs. It was interested in whether, given that the mains had been
buried to a depth that would prevent their freezing in any ordinary
frost, the incremental expense of protecting against an unusually se-
vere frost would have been justified by the incremental reduction in
accident costs brought about by such an expense.6 9
Evaluating the costs and benefits of a particular untaken precaution seems
more consistent with the cost-benefit approach than with the P*-compari-
son approach. It is true, however, that a court can attempt to locate P* by
searching for untaken precautions that would have been cost-beneficial.
Indeed, if an injurer operates at P*, no untaken precaution could possibly
have that property. What Landes and Posner neglect, however, is that
untaken precautions beyond P* can have greater benefits than costs when
the injurer is taking less precaution than P*. Landes and Posner seem to
embrace the cost-benefit condition as the test of liability when they do
their case analysis, but they neglect the point that this condition, if it is
not further restricted, leads to a liability beyond P* that is inconsistent
with their theory.
Conclusion
This Article identifies an alternative to the conventional approach of
comparing an injurer's level of precaution with the level that would mini-
mize social costs. The proposed alternative, to compare the costs and bene-
fits of an untaken precaution that was a "but for" cause of the accident, is
preferable for two reasons. First, as a formal economic model, it appears
more likely to promote the minimization of social costs. More importantly,
it is more consistent with the actual practice of the courts. Thus, from the
standpoint of the two criteria that are relevant to the evaluation of the
positive economic theory of tort, the proposed approach performs better
than the conventional theory that it seeks to replace.
68. 11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856); see Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 895-96.
69. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 896; see also id. at 896-97 (discussing additional costs and
benefits of untaken precautions).
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